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Genetic Information and Investment in Human Capital

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.

Publishing year

1997

Language

English

Pages

435-452

Publication/Series

Journal of Health Economics

Volume

16

Issue

4

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Health Care Service and Management, Health Policy and Services and Health Economy

Keywords

  • Bayesian equilibrium
  • Genetic tests
  • Informativeness
  • Value of information

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1879-1646