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Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

Publishing year

2006

Language

English

Publication/Series

Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

Issue

11

Document type

Working paper

Publisher

Department of Economics, Lund University

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Indivisible objects
  • fairness
  • coalitionally strat

Status

Published