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Relacje Wartości

Value Relations

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

The paper provides a general account of value relations. It takes its departure in a special type of value relation, parity, which, according to Ruth Chang, is a form of evaluative comparability that differs from the three standard forms of comparability: betterness, worseness and equal goodness. Recently, Joshua Gert has suggested that the notion of parity can be accounted for, if value comparisons are interpreted as normative assessments of preference. While Gert’s basic idea is attractive, the way he develops it is flawed: His modeling of values by intervals of permissible preference strengths is inadequate. Instead, I provide an alternative modeling in terms of intersections of rationally permissible preference orderings. This yields a general taxonomy of all binary value relations. The paper concludes with some implications of this approach for rational choice.

Publishing year

2009

Language

Polish

Pages

85-120

Publication/Series

Etyka

Volume

42

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper

Topic

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0014-2263