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Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason

Author

Summary, in English

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming.

Publishing year

2003

Language

English

Pages

219-240

Publication/Series

Studia Logica

Volume

73

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Studia Logica

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • belief revision
  • rational choice
  • reason
  • practical
  • theoretical
  • unity
  • AGM

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1572-8730