Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason
Author
Summary, in English
Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming.
Department/s
Publishing year
2003
Language
English
Pages
219-240
Publication/Series
Studia Logica
Volume
73
Issue
2
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Studia Logica
Topic
- Philosophy
Keywords
- belief revision
- rational choice
- reason
- practical
- theoretical
- unity
- AGM
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1572-8730