Social laws should be conceived as a special case of mechanisms : A reply to Daniel Little
Author
Summary, in English
I am grateful to Daniel Little for his insightful reply to my recent article in Social Epistemology (2012, 105-114) about what appears to be a flaw in Jon Elster’s conception of mechanisms. I agree with much of what Little says, but want to amplify a different underlying problem with Elster’s conception (fourth point below) than Little suggests in his reply (third point below). This underlying problem connects nicely with a passage in Little’s reply, which he thinks unconnected with the point on which I focus.
Department/s
Publishing year
2012
Language
English
Pages
12-14
Publication/Series
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Volume
1
Issue
7
Full text
- Available as PDF - 102 kB
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Document type
Journal article (letter)
Topic
- Philosophy
- Educational Sciences
Keywords
- social explanation
- Jon Elster
- mechanistic explanation
- covering law
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 2471-9560