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Decision Science : From Ramsey to Dual Process Theories

Author

Summary, in English

The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, lack a firm conceptual framework, and have no means of producing independent evidence for their case.

Publishing year

2010

Language

English

Pages

129-143

Publication/Series

Synthese

Volume

172

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Medical and Health Sciences
  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • decision science
  • decision theory
  • human reasoning
  • decision-making
  • dual process theory
  • rationality
  • prospect theory
  • economic man
  • Ramsey
  • normative man
  • expected utility

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0039-7857