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Is moral internalism supported by folk intuitions?

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Author

Summary, in English

In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.

Publishing year

2013

Language

English

Pages

319-335

Publication/Series

Philosophical Psychology

Volume

26

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Taylor & Francis

Topic

  • Psychology

Keywords

  • Internalism
  • Externalism
  • Moral Judgment
  • Moral Motivation
  • Experimental Philosophy
  • Intuition

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1465-394X