An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions
Author
Summary, in Swedish
Abstract in Undetermined
This paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from Peters and Severinov [Peters, M., Severinov, S., 2006. Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory 130, 220–245]. The investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions, and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts.
This paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from Peters and Severinov [Peters, M., Severinov, S., 2006. Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory 130, 220–245]. The investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions, and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts.
Department/s
Publishing year
2012
Language
English
Pages
99-101
Publication/Series
Economics Letters
Volume
116
Issue
1
Links
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Elsevier
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- Price uniformity
- Efficiency
- Cross-bidding
- Competing auctions
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 0165-1765