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An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions

Author

Summary, in Swedish

Abstract in Undetermined

This paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from Peters and Severinov [Peters, M., Severinov, S., 2006. Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory 130, 220–245]. The investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions, and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts.

Publishing year

2012

Language

English

Pages

99-101

Publication/Series

Economics Letters

Volume

116

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Price uniformity
  • Efficiency
  • Cross-bidding
  • Competing auctions

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0165-1765