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On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria

Author

Summary, in English

In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Publishing year

2012

Language

English

Pages

504-507

Publication/Series

Economics Letters

Volume

115

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Beliefs
  • Sequential equilibrium
  • Existence

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0165-1765