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Explanations are about concepts and concept formation

På svenska

Author

Editor

  • Petri Ylikoski
  • Johannes Persson

Summary, in English

In this paper, I wish to argue that an explanation is not a logical structure¸ that it cannot be characterised in syntactic terms, but that it is rather an epistemological structure, and, more specifically, a structure organising conceptual content. I will start from a trivial example and systematically look at the effects of making premises more general or more specific or of reshuffling the same content into another set of premises, thereby exposing the implicit suppositions and consequences of some commonly held views and showing their untenability.

Publishing year

2007

Language

English

Publication/Series

Rethinking Explanation

Document type

Book chapter

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISBN: 978-1-4020-5580-5