Foresight, function representation, and social intelligence in great apes (Commentary on K. Vaesen “The cognitive basis of human tool use”)
Author
Summary, in English
We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.
Department/s
- Cognitive Science
- LUCS Cognitive Zoology Group
Publishing year
2012
Language
English
Pages
234-235
Publication/Series
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume
35
Issue
4
Document type
Journal article (comment)
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Topic
- Zoology
- Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
- Learning
- General Language Studies and Linguistics
Status
Published
Research group
- Lund University Cognitive Science (LUCS)
- LUCS Cognitive Zoology Group
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1469-1825