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Foresight, function representation, and social intelligence in great apes (Commentary on K. Vaesen “The cognitive basis of human tool use”)

Author

Summary, in English

We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.

Department/s

Publishing year

2012

Language

English

Pages

234-235

Publication/Series

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume

35

Issue

4

Document type

Journal article (comment)

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

Topic

  • Zoology
  • Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
  • Learning
  • General Language Studies and Linguistics

Status

Published

Research group

  • Lund University Cognitive Science (LUCS)
  • LUCS Cognitive Zoology Group

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1469-1825