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Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness

Author

  • Alexander Reffgen

Summary, in English

The Gibbard–Satterthwaite (GS) theorem is generalized in three ways: First, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; second, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function (SCF) is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; third, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the SCF are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives.

Publishing year

2011

Language

English

Pages

39-59

Publication/Series

Social Choice and Welfare

Volume

37

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Economics

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0176-1714