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A philosophical view on concepts in psychiatry

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Author

Summary, in English

This essay first outlines a philosophical theory of concepts and then applies it to two areas of relevance to psychiatrists, especially forensic psychiatrists. In the philosophical theory, the respective roles of verbal and non-verbal definitions are illuminated, and the importance of the phenomenon of division of semantic labour is stressed. It is pointed out that vagueness and ambiguity of a term often result when the term is used for several practical purposes at the same time. Such multi-purpose uses of terms may explain both the current problems associated with the Swedish forensic-psychiatric concept of a severe mental disorder and some of the shortcomings of DSM-IV. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Publishing year

2010

Language

English

Pages

66-72

Publication/Series

International Journal of Law and Psychiatry

Volume

33

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Operational definitions
  • psychiatry
  • Forensic
  • Diagnostic criteria
  • Concepts
  • Conceptual analysis
  • Severe mental disorder

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0160-2527