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Career concerns, contracts, and effort distortions

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.

Publishing year

2002

Language

English

Pages

42-58

Publication/Series

Journal Labor Economics

Volume

20

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

University of Chicago Press

Topic

  • Economics

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1537-5307