The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Whatever it is better to be than not to be

Author

Summary, in English

The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.

Department/s

Publishing year

2013

Language

English

Pages

131-143

Publication/Series

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Volume

74

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Religious Studies

Keywords

  • Anselm
  • God
  • Universal value-commensurability
  • Greatness
  • Possibilism
  • Actualism
  • Morality
  • Actuality

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0020-7047