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A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

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Author

Summary, in English

Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Publishing year

2007

Language

English

Pages

398-401

Publication/Series

Economics Letters

Volume

95

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • repeated
  • noncooperative game theory
  • weak renegotiation-proofness
  • bertrand games

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0165-1765