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Decision making with unreliable probabilities

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Author

Summary, in English

This paper presents a decision theory which allows subjects to account for the uncertainties of their probability estimates. This is accomplished by modelling beliefs about states of nature by means of a class of probability measures. In order to represent uncertainties of those beliefs a measure of epistemic reliability is introduced. The suggested decision theory is evaluated in the light of empirical evidence on ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making. The theory is also compared to Tversky & Kahneman's prospect theory.

Publishing year

1983

Language

English

Pages

240-251

Publication/Series

British Journal of Mathematical & Statistical Psychology

Volume

36

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

The British Psychological Society

Topic

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0007-1102