Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies
Author
Summary, in English
Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and
why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the
literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an
important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies.
why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the
literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an
important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies.
Publishing year
2011
Language
English
Pages
441-478
Publication/Series
European Journal of Political Research
Volume
50
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Wiley
Topic
- Political Science
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 0304-4130