The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

What is explanatory asymmetry?

På svenska

Author

Editor

  • Mika Kiikeri
  • Petri Ylikoski

Summary, in English

The overall aim of this paper is to examine the claim that explanation is asymmetrical because causation is asymmetrical. The link between causal and explanatory asymmetry is focussed on. It is argued that many theories of causation account for causal asymmetry in a way that stops a causal model from contributing to our understanding of explanatory asymmetry. What appears to be generally advantageous with causal approaches

is normally true only of a few specific causal accounts. These remaining alternatives, however, may well have some less attractive features that would never be brought to mind in the familiar explanatory contexts of balloons, flag

poles, and the like—and with a standard concept of causation.

Publishing year

2001

Language

English

Pages

1-22

Publication/Series

Explanatory Connections: Electronic essays dedicated to Matti Sintonen

Document type

Book chapter

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • causal explanation

Status

Published