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Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain

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Author

Summary, in English

In analyses of strategy-proof voting, two results feature prominently: the dictatorial characterization contained in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the voting by committees characterization in the Barbera-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem. The two theorems are based on voting procedures defined on the domain of strict preferences. In the present study, we derive corresponding results for voting schemes defined on the full domain of weak preferences and obtain a characterization by means of a combination of sequential dictatorship and voting by extended committees.

Publishing year

2006

Language

English

Pages

272-287

Publication/Series

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume

52

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Barbers-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem
  • strategy-proof voting
  • Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0165-4896