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Free to Trade? Commission Autonomy in Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations

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Author

Summary, in English

In this article, we suggest that the degree of (dis)unity - both between the member states (MS) in the Council and within the Commission - is a key factor in affecting the balance between Commission autonomy and MS control in international trade negotiations. We shed empirical light on this issue, and on the relative influence of MS and the Commission in general, through a case study of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. We suggest that the differing preferences and priorities among MS and the relative cohesiveness of the Commission provided the Commission with quite a high degree of autonomy during all phases of the EPA negotiations. The informational and procedural advantages given by its institutional position as sole negotiator also contributed to the significant autonomy of the Commission.

Publishing year

2010

Language

English

Pages

205-223

Publication/Series

Journal of European Public Policy

Volume

17

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Taylor & Francis

Topic

  • Political Science

Keywords

  • cohesiveness
  • ACP countries
  • Commission autonomy
  • EPA negotiations
  • member state control
  • trade negotiations

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1350-1763