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Offices and policies – Why do oppositional parties form pre-electoral coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes?

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Author

  • Michael Wahman

Summary, in English

Although previous research has suggested that the opposition’s ability to form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) in authoritarian elections is crucial for the electoral outcome, little has been written about why and when such coalitions are formed. The aim of this article is to fill this empirical and theoretical gap. A theory that combines oppositional parties’ office- and policy-gaining potential when creating such coalitions is proposed. The article utilizes a unique database of 111 competitive authoritarian elections and provides a representative sample of strategically chosen cases. It is shown that, coalitions are more likely when structural conditions favor oppositional victories and when oppositional parties have a distinctive policy agenda in relation to the incumbent government. These factors are shown to be more important than electoral institutions.

Publishing year

2011

Language

English

Pages

642-657

Publication/Series

Electoral Studies

Volume

30

Issue

4

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Political Science

Keywords

  • Coalition
  • Authoritarian
  • Party
  • Opposition
  • Policy
  • Democratization
  • Election

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1873-6890