The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

The Doughnut Fallacy as Deliberative Failure

Author

Summary, in English

Abstract in Undetermined
The Doughnut fallacy hypothesis posits that many debaters tend to sup- port their arguments using collapsed generalities – such as “democracy” – with pur- ported self-evident positive or negative qualities as philosophical grounding. This will leave an often unexamined hole in the middle of the debate which will stunt delib- erative processes, as it effectively stops deliberation from proceeding to the “philo- sophical core” of the debate. The authors contend that the fallacy is particularly devi- ous as analysis of individual arguments will not necessary detect it (and may in fact conclude that it is evidence of good deliberation) as the problem is only evident on the discourse level. It could be seen as an unexplored subgroup of the already noted Aristotelian fallacy of ambiguity. This piece will explore the fallacy, relate it to extant thinking, formalise assessment of it, and finally prepare the ground for future quan- titative analysis of its deliberative impact (to be carried out on its own or as part of a larger effort, e.g., an index).

Publishing year

2011

Language

English

Pages

147-171

Publication/Series

Cogency - Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation

Volume

3

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Universidad Diego Portales

Topic

  • Media and Communications
  • Political Science

Keywords

  • Fallacies
  • deliberation
  • debate analysis
  • congruity
  • glittering generalities

Status

Published

Research group

  • Förvaltning - demokrati
  • Politisk kommunikation

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0718-8285