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Truth and Lie Detection in Bluffing

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Author

Summary, in English

Beliefs in signals that reveal lies and truths are widespread. It is shown that such beliefs may be exploited strategically in signaling games of pure conflict of interest. Truth and lie detection is modeled by signals perceived by the receiver that are emitted with a probability contingent on the truth value of the sender's message. Truth or lie detection of this kind always shrinks the equilibrium set and if the probability for the truth or lie signal is sufficiently large the resulting equilibrium is unique. These results are robust to asymmetries regarding prior probabilities and payoffs.

Publishing year

2010

Language

English

Pages

318-324

Publication/Series

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volume

76

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Bluffing
  • Game theory
  • Truth detection
  • Lie detection

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0167-2681