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Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings

Author

Summary, in English

Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.

Publishing year

2004

Language

English

Publication/Series

LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.

Document type

Report

Publisher

Department of Philosophy, Lund University

Topic

  • Psychology

Status

Published

Report number

2004:1

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1404-3718