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Predicting the Effects of Intervention and Sabotage in a Boundedly Complex Game

Author

Summary, in English

Conditions for predicting the effects of intervention with certainty are derived. An outside observer studies sequences of actions from a two-person repeated prisoners' dilemma. The sequences are generated by finite automata, which are optimal at each stage of the game and also minimize the number of states. An intervention is a change of action for one of the players and a prediction is a statement about what action the other player will choose in the next period. One result is that predictions can always be made certain at some stages of the game.

Publishing year

1992

Language

English

Pages

321-342

Publication/Series

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume

24

Issue

2-3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Complex game
  • finite automata
  • prisoners' dilemma

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0165-4896