Sharing Secrets : Explaining International Intelligence Cooperation
Author
Summary, in English
Why has multilateral cooperation developed in the intelligence field? Prior research has deemed such cooperation unlikely, irrelevant or even dangerous due to low gains and high risks. However, multilateral intelligence cooperation both exists and seems to be on the increase. This study aims to explain this puzzling development.
Drawing on institutional theory, the author advances a model of international intelligence cooperation. The model is applied to the development of multilateral intelligence cooperation in Europe. Based partly on a unique set of interviews with intelligence officers from eleven states, three cooperative forums are analyzed in detail: Europol, the EU Situation Centre and the Counterterrorism Group. The author finds that apart from state preferences, the development of intelligence cooperation is largely determined by the self-interest and culture of national agencies, international institutional entrepreneurship and the way power-asymmetries are mirrored in the design of cooperative arrangements. As well as generating a more thorough understanding of the costs and benefits of international intelligence cooperation, the study offers important insights into future directions of cooperation and its connection to both national security and international policy-making.
Drawing on institutional theory, the author advances a model of international intelligence cooperation. The model is applied to the development of multilateral intelligence cooperation in Europe. Based partly on a unique set of interviews with intelligence officers from eleven states, three cooperative forums are analyzed in detail: Europol, the EU Situation Centre and the Counterterrorism Group. The author finds that apart from state preferences, the development of intelligence cooperation is largely determined by the self-interest and culture of national agencies, international institutional entrepreneurship and the way power-asymmetries are mirrored in the design of cooperative arrangements. As well as generating a more thorough understanding of the costs and benefits of international intelligence cooperation, the study offers important insights into future directions of cooperation and its connection to both national security and international policy-making.
Department/s
Publishing year
2010
Language
English
Publication/Series
Lund Political Studies
Issue
161
Document type
Dissertation
Publisher
Lund University
Topic
- Political Science
Keywords
- Intelligence Cooperation
- Historical Institutionalism
- Rational Choice Institutionalism
- Europol
- SitCen
- CTG
- EU
- European External Action Service
- European Union
- Intelligence
Status
Published
Supervisor
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISBN: 978-91-88306-80-7
Defence date
4 December 2010
Defence time
10:15
Defence place
Edens Hörsal, Paradisgatan 5 H, Lund
Opponent
- Jonas Tallberg (Professor)