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A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited

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Author

Summary, in English

This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.

Publishing year

2009

Language

English

Pages

1719-1724

Publication/Series

Economics Bulletin

Volume

29

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article (letter)

Publisher

Economics Bulletin

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • assignment game
  • fairness
  • strategy-proofness

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1545-2921