Javascript is not activated in your browser. This website needs javascript activated to work properly.
You are here

Value Grounded on Attitudes. Subjectivism in Value Theory

Publishing year: 2014
Language: English
Document type: Dissertation
Publisher: Lund University (Media-Tryck)


Popular Abstract in English

Does subjectivism in value theory — the view that value is grounded on attitudes — imply that when we think and talk about what is good and bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and other attitudes? Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances are reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude? Are subjectivists committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction is valuable for its own sake? Are subjectivists disqualified from talking about intrinsic value? Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable? Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism? Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism? Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?

In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.
The thesis examines a specific way of understanding the subjectivist position in value theory according to which subjectivism is the view that value is grounded on attitudes. It is argued that this should be seen as a second-order claim about the nature of value although with pluralistic implications on the substantial, first-order level. Subjectivist analyses of final and intrinsic value and of relational value (goodness-for) are offered. Further, the implications of subjectivism are considered with respect to, among other things, situations in which we would have different attitudes than those that we actually have, the relation between value and motivation, and value relativism and egoism. The thesis also contains discussions of value projection and the nature of evaluative language.


C126, LUX, Helgonavägen 3, Lund
  • Ulrike Heuer (Associate Professor)


  • Philosophy
  • Subjectivism
  • objectivism
  • relativism
  • absolutism
  • value and attitudes
  • supervenience and constitutive ground of value
  • final value
  • intrinsic value
  • good and good for
  • motivational internalism
  • idealization
  • value projection
  • error and evaluative language


  • Wlodek Rabinowicz
  • Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
  • ISBN: 978-91-7473-994-7