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Value Grounded on Attitudes. Subjectivism in Value Theory

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Author

Summary, in English

The thesis examines a specific way of understanding the subjectivist position in value theory according to which subjectivism is the view that value is grounded on attitudes. It is argued that this should be seen as a second-order claim about the nature of value although with pluralistic implications on the substantial, first-order level. Subjectivist analyses of final and intrinsic value and of relational value (goodness-for) are offered. Further, the implications of subjectivism are considered with respect to, among other things, situations in which we would have different attitudes than those that we actually have, the relation between value and motivation, and value relativism and egoism. The thesis also contains discussions of value projection and the nature of evaluative language.

Publishing year

2014

Language

English

Document type

Dissertation

Publisher

Lund University (Media-Tryck)

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Subjectivism
  • objectivism
  • relativism
  • absolutism
  • value and attitudes
  • supervenience and constitutive ground of value
  • final value
  • intrinsic value
  • good and good for
  • motivational internalism
  • idealization
  • value projection
  • error and evaluative language

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISBN: 978-91-7473-994-7

Defence date

13 September 2014

Defence time

10:15

Defence place

C126, LUX, Helgonavägen 3, Lund

Opponent

  • Ulrike Heuer (Associate Professor)