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Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

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Author

Summary, in English

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.

Publishing year

2012

Language

English

Pages

663-688

Publication/Series

Theoretical Economics

Volume

7

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Econometric Society

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Multiple public goods
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Voting under constraints
  • Additive preferences
  • Separable preferences

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1555-7561