The family as the health producer--when spouses act strategically.
Author
Summary, in English
The Grossman model has been extended recently in order to take account of the fact that most people lead their lives in a family--using frameworks in which family members, respectively, (a) have common preferences and (b) are Nash-bargainers. These models, however, do not consider individual incentives for behaving strategically. In the model presented in this paper, spouses interact strategically both in the production of own health and in the production of health of other family members. We analyse, inter alia, the impact on the distribution of health of changes in family policies, such as child allowance and custody rules.
Publishing year
2002
Language
English
Pages
475-495
Publication/Series
Journal of Health Economics
Volume
21
Issue
3
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Elsevier
Topic
- Health Care Service and Management, Health Policy and Services and Health Economy
Keywords
- Investments : statistics & numerical data
- Investments : economics
- Human
- Health Services Needs and Demand : statistics & numerical data
- Health Services Needs and Demand : economics
- Health Behavior
- Female
- Family Health
- Efficiency
- Divorce : economics
- Decision Making
- Child
- Conflict of Interest
- Child Welfare : economics
- Male
- Models
- Econometric
- Patient Acceptance of Health Care : statistics & numerical data
- Spouses : psychology
- Adult
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1879-1646