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Nonlinear Taxation and Punishment

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Author

Summary, in English

The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n ≥ 3 differing individuals. It is demonstrated that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self‐selection can only be identified by maximizing a welfare function of the above form if (at least) one of the individuals in the economy is assigned a negative weight.

Publishing year

2007

Language

English

Pages

49-58

Publication/Series

International Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

3

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Topic

  • Economics

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1742-7355