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Two General Attacks on Pomaranch-like Keystream Generators

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Author

Editor

  • Alex Biryukov

Summary, in English

Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are known. The attack will succeed on all versions of Pomaranch with complexities much lower than previously known attacks.

Publishing year

2007

Language

English

Pages

274-289

Publication/Series

Fast Software Encryption / Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volume

4593

Document type

Conference paper

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering

Keywords

  • distinguishing attack
  • Stream ciphers
  • eSTREAM
  • Pomaranch.
  • resynchronization attack

Conference name

14th International Workshop, FSE 2007

Conference date

2007-03-26 - 2007-03-28

Status

Published

Research group

  • Informations- och kommunikationsteori

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0302-9743
  • ISSN: 1611-3349
  • ISBN: 978-3-540-74617-1