Predicting the shrinking generator with fixed connections

Summary, in English

We propose a novel distinguishing attack on the shrinking generator with known feedback polynomial for the generating LFSR. The attack can e.g. reliably distinguish a shrinking generator with a weight 4 polynomial of degree as large as 10000, using 2(32) output bits. As the feedback polynomial of an arbitrary LFSR is known to have a polynomial multiple of low weight, our distinguisher applies to arbitrary shrunken LFSR's of moderate length. The analysis can also be used to predict the distribution of blocks in the generated keystream.

• Author: Patrik Ekdahl; W Meier; Thomas Johansson
• Department/s: Department of Electrical and Information Technology
• Publishing year: 2003
• Language: English
• Pages: 330-344
• Publication/Series: Advances in Cryptology / Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Volume: 2656
• Links: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_20
• Document type: Conference paper
• Publisher: Springer
• Topic: Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
• Conference name: EUROCRYPT 2003: International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
• Conference date: 2003-05-04 - 2003-05-08
• Conference place: Warsaw, Poland
• Status: Published
• ISBN/ISSN/Other: ISSN: 1611-3349; ISSN: 0302-9743