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Liberty, Law and Leviathan. Of Being Free from Impediments by Artifice

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

The argument in this paper is that Hobbes’ theory of freedom in Leviathan allows for four ways of being free to act – corporal freedom by nature, freedom from obligation by nature, the freedom to disobey, and the freedom of no-rule – each corresponding to a particular absence, some of which make sense only in the civil state. Contrary to what some have claimed, this complexity does not commit Hobbes to an unarticulated definition of freedom in tension with the only one that he explicitly offers, which is that freedom consists of nothing other than the absence of external impediments of motion. To be free from obligation is to be free from impediments. As a political subject in the state, the power that is blocked or compelled by law is a person’s power to perform artificial acts as her will directs. Laws and prior commitments are external impediments that block or compel making an artificial, institution dependent act either impossible or unavoidable. The bonds of law bind artificially yet corporally given that the power that makes them is, quite literally, an external body that moves at will.

Publishing year

2012

Language

English

Pages

1-20

Publication/Series

Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy

Volume

59

Issue

131

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Thales

Topic

  • Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Keywords

  • Hobbes
  • liberty
  • law
  • Leviathan
  • artifice
  • obligation
  • impediment
  • act
  • institution

Status

Published

Project

  • Liberty, Law and Leviathan

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0040-5825