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Strategic Self-Ignorance

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Author

  • Linda Thunström
  • Jonas Nordström
  • Jason Shogren
  • Mariah Ehmke
  • Klaas van 't Veld

Summary, in English

We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to overindulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals—a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.

Publishing year

2016-04-10

Language

English

Document type

Working paper

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • experiment
  • ignorance
  • food
  • harmful activities

Status

Published