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What to do with a forecast?

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Author

  • George Masterton

Summary, in English

In the literature one nds two non-equivalent responses to forecasts; deference and updating. Herein it is demonstrated that, under certain conditions, both responses are entirely determined by one's beliefs as regards the calibration of the forecaster. Further it is argued that the choice as to whether to defer to, or update on, a forecast is determined by the aim of the recipient of that forecast. If the aim of the recipient is to match their credence with the prevailing objective chances, they should defer to the forecast; if it

is to maximize the veritistic value of their beliefs, they should update on the forecast.

Department/s

Publishing year

2014

Language

English

Pages

1881-1907

Publication/Series

Synthese

Volume

191

Issue

8

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Deference
  • Forecast
  • Calibration
  • Bayesianism

Status

Published

Research group

  • Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0039-7857