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Equivocation for the Objective Bayesian

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Author

  • George Masterton

Summary, in English

According to Williamson (In defense of objective Bayesianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson's prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson's calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance hypotheses. The objective Bayesian equivocates between these calibrated density functions rather than between the calibrated probability functions themselves. The result is an objective Bayesianism that avoids the main problem afflicting Williamson's original proposal.

Publishing year

2015

Language

English

Pages

403-432

Publication/Series

Erkenntnis

Volume

80

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Equivocation
  • Calibration
  • Objective Bayesianism
  • Entropy maximization
  • Jon Williamson

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1572-8420