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Locke and the Non-arbitrary

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Author

Summary, in English

In this article, John Locke's accounts of political liberty and legitimate government are read as expressions of a normative demand for non-arbitrariness. I argue that Locke locates infringements of political liberty in dependence on the arbitrary will of another, whether or not interference or restraint actually takes place. This way Locke is tentatively placed in that tradition of republican thought recently brought to our attention by Pettit, Skinner and others. This reading shifts the focus on legitimacy and identifies the independent moral argument for legitimate government as ruling for the good of the people. Consent is left with a hypothetical role to play.

Publishing year

2003

Language

English

Pages

261-279

Publication/Series

European Journal of Political Theory

Volume

2

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • dependence
  • government
  • hypothetical consent
  • legitimacy
  • liberty
  • Locke
  • non-arbitrariness
  • public good
  • republicanism
  • trust

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1741-2730