The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Rule-Following, Meaning Constitution and Enaction

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. According to the standard formulation, influenced by Kripke, the paradox invites us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. The author proposes instead an enactivist understanding of the paradox. On this account there is no essential gap between mental items and behavioral patterns such that the paradox enforces a choice between meaning being constituted either internally ‘in mind,’ or externally ‘in behavior.’ The paper begins with an introduction to the paradox and then presents arguments against standard solutions. It ends with the enactivist proposal, admitting that although much more needs to be said before it can be established as a full-fledged alternative, it nonetheless holds some promise both for revising our understanding of the paradox and for the formulation of a novel solution.

Department/s

Publishing year

2015

Language

English

Pages

110-120

Publication/Series

Human Affairs

Volume

25

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

De Gruyter

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Wittgenstein
  • Rule-following
  • Meaning
  • Enaction
  • Interaction

Status

Published

Research group

  • CogComlab

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1337-401X