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An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

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Author

Summary, in English

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

Publishing year

2014

Language

English

Publication/Series

Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University

Issue

35

Document type

Working paper

Publisher

Department of Economics, Lund University

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • least manipulable envy-free rules
  • algorithm

Status

Published