Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods

Summary, in English

This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.

• Author: Lars-Gunnar Svensson; Pär Torstensson
• Department/s: Department of Economics
• Publishing year: 2008
• Language: English
• Pages: 181-196
• Publication/Series: Social Choice and Welfare
• Volume: 30
• Issue: 2
• Links: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0221-8
• Document type: Journal article
• Publisher: Springer
• Topic: Economics
• Status: Published
• ISBN/ISSN/Other: ISSN: 0176-1714