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A predatory democracy? An essay on taxation in classical Athens

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Author

Summary, in English

Predatory rule is defined here as a tendency to maximize state revenue, subject to the rulers′ relative bargaining power and transaction costs (Levi, M., 1988, Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: Univ. California Press; North, D. C., 1981, Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton). I suggest that the implicit bargaining between Athenian "politicians" and the poor majority generated predatory rule and that this framework improves our understanding of taxation in democratic Athens. For example, it is shown that the choice of taxes and their organization served to economize on transaction costs and that the bargaining power of the rich together with the notion of quasi-voluntary compliance may help to explain the changes in taxation of wealth.

Publishing year

1994

Language

English

Pages

62-90

Publication/Series

Explorations in Economic History

Volume

31

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • History and Archaeology
  • Economic History
  • Economics

Status

Published

Project

  • The Economics of Ancient Greece

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0014-4983