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Dislodging Butterflies from the Supervenient

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Author

Editor

  • Stephen Voss

Summary, in English

Not all areas in value theory are battlegrounds. We find, for instance, a strong consensus when it comes to whether or not values are so-called supervenient properties, i.e., properties that accrue to the value bearer in virtue of some or all of its other kinds of (subvenient) properties. These ‘other properties’ are often assumed to belong (at least at some basic level) to the object’s so-called natural properties (in a wide sense of ‘natural’ that would include, for instance, psychological features). Unfortunately, this consensus does not extend to questions concerning the precise nature of this relation. Just how we should best describe the linkage between natural and value properties has been a much-discussed topic since Moore put the matter on the value theorist’s agenda. In this paper I discuss, after some preliminary comments in section 1, an early attempt to explain supervenience, viz., R. M. Hare’s view as it is presented in his article “Supervenience”

Publishing year

2006

Language

English

Publication/Series

Philosophical Anthropology : The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy

Volume

9

Document type

Book chapter

Publisher

Philosophical Society of Turkey

Topic

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISBN: 9789757748403