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Varför finns det sådant som inte måste finnas?

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

Not only the argument from contingency for the existence of God but also the theistic idea that God is the metaphysical foundation of the world seem to presuppose the intelligibility and validity of the following question: Why is there anything contingent at all? However, it has been argued that, upon closer inspection, this question is a pseudo-question: a question which presupposes illegitimate or somehow ill-founded assumptions. In this article I respond to some of this criticism, especially to that given by David Hume and Adolf Grünbaum. I argue that there seems to be no good reason to think that the question under consideration should not continue to receive proper philosophical attention.

Department/s

Publishing year

2012

Language

Swedish

Pages

89-94

Publication/Series

Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift

Volume

88

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Gleerups Utbildning AB

Topic

  • Religious Studies

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0039-6761