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Non-Cognitivism and Validity

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

In this paper I defend against a certain objection the view that it is possible to account for validity and kindred notions for moral language within a non-cognitivist framework by appeal to the descriptive meaning of moral terms. The objection is that such an account leads to an asymmetry in the accounts it offers for synonymy in different contexts; in certain contexts it holds that sameness of meaning for a moral term depends on its evaluative meaning, in other contexts that it depends on the term's descriptive meaning. In the third part of the paper I try to show why non-cognitivists should be prepared to live with that asymmetry. In the process I also deal with two other objections.

Publishing year

2007

Language

English

Pages

121-147

Publication/Series

Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy

Volume

73

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Thales

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • validity
  • descriptive meaning
  • Non-cognitivism
  • inference
  • attitudes

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0040-5825