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Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited

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Author

Summary, in English

Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place. While this expansion of the original proposal might seem intuitive, given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis.

Publishing year

2012

Language

English

Pages

1-17

Publication/Series

Acta Analytica

Volume

28

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Attitudinal content
  • Buck-passing account
  • Dual-role analysis
  • Fitting-attitude analysis
  • Motivating reason
  • Normative reason
  • Value.

Status

Published

Project

  • On Our Good Reasons

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0353-5150