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Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor's Theorem

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Author

Summary, in English

Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.

Department/s

Publishing year

2013

Language

English

Pages

211-223

Publication/Series

Forum Philosophicum

Volume

17

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie

Topic

  • Religious Studies

Keywords

  • Cantor's Theorem
  • Patrick Grim
  • Omniscience
  • Self-Referential Incoherence
  • Set Theoretical Paradoxes

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1426-1898