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Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction

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Author

Summary, in English

Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore (personal communication) is that normative reasons are facts of a peculiar kind: they are subjunctive facts of a certain kind.

Publishing year

2010

Language

English

Document type

Conference paper

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • agent-relative reason
  • agent-neutral reason
  • couter-factual
  • subjunctive facts

Conference name

Workshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Conference date

2010-04-29 - 2010-04-30

Conference place

Münster, Germany

Status

Unpublished

Project

  • On Our Good Reasons