The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Denying Antecedents and Affirming Consequents: The State of the Art

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

Recent work on conditional reasoning argues that denying the antecedent [DA] and affirming the consequent [AC] are defeasible but cogent patterns of argument, either because they are effective, rational, albeit heuristic applications of Bayesian probability, or because they are licensed by the principle of total evidence. Against this, we show that on any prevailing interpretation of indicative conditionals the premises of DA and AC arguments do not license their conclusions without additional assumptions. The cogency of DA and AC inferences rather depends on contingent factors extrinsic to, and independent of, what is asserted by DA and AC arguments.

Publishing year

2015

Language

English

Pages

88-134

Publication/Series

Informal Logic

Volume

35

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Informal Logic, University of Windsor, ON, Canada

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • affirming the consequent
  • Bayesian probability
  • conditional perfection
  • denying the antecedent
  • fallacy
  • heuristics
  • total evidence

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0824-2577